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"E" IS FOR ECLECTIC: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON
EVIDENCE
Richard D. Friedman*
INTRODUCTION

conference titled "New Perspectives on Evidence: Experts,
Empirical Study and Economics" has a pronounced alliterative theme, a theme made even more apparent when, inevitably in
evidentiary discourse, epistemological questions come to the fore.
It is enough to make one suspect that the conference is secretly
brought to you by the letter "E," hiding behind its public front, the
Olin Foundation. Putting aside such conspiratorial thoughts, all
these "E's" suggest the presence of a meta-"E"-Eclecticism. Indeed, I believe this conference has demonstrated the need for an
eclectic approach to evidentiary problems.
That should be no surprise. The domain of evidentiary law and
discourse is determined not by a given intellectual approach butto the extent it is determined at all-by a set of problems, central
among which is the question of what kinds of information ought to
be presented to an adjudicative factfinder. One trying to provide
sensible, useful analysis of an evidentiary problem acts at her peril
if she ignores any available source of wisdom and guidance.
One consequence of eclecticism is that we do not have to worry
about boundaries very much at all. Does a particular line of
reasoning qualify as economic?1 It does not particularly matter;
however the line may be characterized, if the reasoning advances
analysis, that is all to the good.
For expository convenience, though, I will discuss separately
three "E"-perspectives that are important in this symposium: emA

* Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.

'For example, at the symposium Professor Richard Lempert and Judge Richard A.

Posner debated whether the "veil of ignorance" associated with John Rawls is an
economic concept. See Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law:
Common Sense on Stilts, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1619, 1665-66 (2001) (discussing Rawlsian
"veil of ignorance" analysis as a noneconomic argument). In general, I believe

Lempert may take too narrow a view of what constitutes an economic argument, but
little or nothing depends on the definitional matter.
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piricism, economics, and epistemology. Eclecticism means that
multiple perspectives on evidentiary problems may have something
to offer. The other side of that coin is that no given perspective is a
panacea; each one leaves work for others to do. I will discuss the
value and limitations of each of these three perspectives. I will then
focus on one particular "E"-problem that has been addressed in
this symposium, that of expert evidence. I will suggest how each of
these approaches-I do not mean to exclude others-can assist
analysis and understanding of expert evidence, and I will focus on
the core issue of the standard for admitting such evidence.
One substantive theme will run throughout many of my comments. I believe the proposition that some evidence must be
excluded because the jury is likely to overvalue it has been given
far too much credence in evidentiary discourse.2 Exclusion is not
justified on the basis of overvaluation unless the jury so massively
overvalues the evidence that considering the evidence leads it further away from, rather than closer to, the truth. In fact, the
empirical evidence does not support the proposition that overvaluation is a significant phenomenon. I think we should try to
construct evidence law without relying on an overvaluation rationale. In some situations, exclusionary rules may be justified on other
grounds, such as the vindication of deep underlying values or the
prospect that the evidence would bias the jury against a party (a
factor altogether different from overvaluation).3 In other situations,
exclusion is simply unjustified.

2 For example, Allen and Leiter say: "We may ask of any particular rule: Does it
increase the likelihood that jurors will reach true beliefs about disputed matters of

fact?" Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1491, 1498 (2001). They acknowledge that this is not an
appropriate question to ask of every rule, because some are meant "to carry out
various policy objectives like reducing accidents and avoiding litigation." Id. My own
view is that exclusion of evidence is only rarely justified on the ground that the

evidence makes it more likely that jurors will reach untrue beliefs about disputed
matters; to the extent that exclusion is justified, it is almost always on other grounds.
3 Thus, Allen and Leiter err when they say that "the worry that 'jurors [will] misuse
certain types of evidence' is precisely the worry that they will misuse them by drawing
inferences that lead to false beliefs." Id. at 1501 (alteration in original). In fact, jurors

may misuse evidence by improperly allowing it to bias them-affecting the standard
of persuasion that they apply-or by using it to draw inferences, perhaps accurate
ones, about propositions that the law deems immaterial.
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I. EMPIRICISM
I understand Professors Ronald J. Allen and Brian Leiter, in
their argument for the application of "naturalized epistemology,"
to be advising us to take account of empirical knowledge in discussing evidentiary law.4 The advice is sound. Whether evidence should
be admissible or not may often depend on considerations such as
how a given set of factors will affect the accuracy of an out-of-court
declarant or of an in-court witness; to what extent the evidence is
likely to be used, or misused, by the jury or other factfinder; and to
what extent alternative rules are likely to affect conduct (including
the production of better evidence) that is of concern to the legal
system. Too often evidentiary pronouncements sound like crackerbarrel psychology or sociology, made with little or no heed to accuracy.' Who can dispute that evidentiary law should, where possible,
be based upon sound perceptions of reality?
For illustrative purposes, I will highlight three areas in which I
believe better empirical understanding can have significant benefits: the role of the jury, hearsay, and character evidence.
The paper by Professors Shari Seidman Diamond and Neil Vidmar in this symposium6 is a wonderful example of empirical
research bearing on the conduct of the jury. Evidentiary rules forbid mention of liability insurance for the purpose of showing that a
person acted wrongfully.' The usual understanding has been that
mention of liability insurance will encourage jurors to reach large
damages awards, comfortable that they are digging deeply into the
insurer's pockets rather than into those of the defendant. Given the
prevalence of insurance, especially for liability in driving motor vehicles, and the easily-understood tendency of large judgments to
increase insurance rates, there has long been reason to doubt that
jurors really do act in this way. Now the actual jury deliberations
4Id.

at 1492-94.
5See, e.g., Idaho v.
traditional justification
proposition that "[n]o
Maker, will do so with

Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (accepting as sound the
for the "dying declaration" exception to the hearsay rule, the
person, who is immediately going into the presence of his
a lie upon his lips") (quoting Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim.

Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881) (Lush, L.J.)).

6Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden
Topics, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1857 (2001).
7E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 411.
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examined by Diamond and Vidmar provide substantial confirmation that jurors do not often play this sock-it-to-the-insurer game.8
At the same time, Diamond and Vidmar show that juries very often do talk about first-party insurance.9 The jurors' concern is that
the plaintiff may be "double dipping," seeking damages to compensate them for the same expenses for which they already
received health insurance proceeds."0 Plaintiffs, it appears, have
much more to lose than do defendants from discussion of insurance.
Of course, jurors are right in that "double dipping" is precisely
what plaintiffs are often doing-and the "collateral source" rule,
for better or worse, allows them to do it. Now it will be interesting
to see whether what Diamond and Vidmar call a "collaborative"
instruction-attempting to explain to jurors why they are not supposed to make a reduction from their award to take presumed
insurance proceeds into account-would have its intended impact."
Could it, perversely, encourage jurors simply to focus more on insurance? More empirical work may be helpful here.
The article by Diamond and Vidmar is part of a large field study
that promises further interesting results. Other types of empirical
research offer benefits for evidentiary law and scholarship. For instance, much of the modern rhetoric of hearsay law emphasizes the
supposed inability of the jury to take into account the defects of
hearsay evidence. Experimental evidence suggests that jurors do
indeed discount hearsay evidence-and indeed may tend to do so
too much rather than too little. 2 If such results turn out to be roSDiamond & Vidmar, supra note 6, at 1894 ("There is little evidence.., that
defendants are disadvantaged by jury discussions about insurance. .. ").
9Id. at 1876 (reporting jury discussion of insurance in 85% of sample cases).
"Id. at 1889-90.
"The proposed instruction presented by Diamond and Vidmar does not quite do
the job. Id. at 1910. The instruction ought to explain to jurors why they are being
asked to determine damages without a deduction for presumed insurance proceeds.

The instruction could explain the collateral source rule. Alternatively, it could state
simply that the question of whether the recovery should be reduced by insurance

proceeds, and if so by how much, is to be determined separately. In either event, the
instruction should tell the jurors clearly that if they do make such a deduction, they
are not doing the job assigned to them and are making the task of the court more
difficult.
12See, e.g., Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and
Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 703 (1992); Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision
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bust, they suggest that defenses of the hearsay rule should not rely
on the perception of juror overvaluation; the exclusionary rule
should be preserved only to the extent that it can be justified on
other grounds.
Sometimes useful empirical knowledge can be gained by examining studies already performed in other disciplines. For example,
Professor Guy Wellborn has forced us to reassess the value of demeanor in assessing credibility;13 thus, it appears that the inability
of a jury to observe the declarant's demeanor while making an outof-court statement may not be a very powerfut reason to exclude
hearsay testimony of that statement.
Similarly, various academic studies of criminal and other antisocial behaviors cast doubt on the received wisdom that the prior
conduct of a person should be inadmissible to prove that the person acted in a given way on a particular occasion because the jury
is likely to overvalue the evidence. In truth, deviant behavior on a
past occasion does make it more likely that a person will act in a
deviant way on another occasion; 4 therefore, a juror giving such
evidence substantial weight may be acting perfectly rationally in
doing so. To the extent that it can be justified, the character evidence rule should rely on grounds other than the anticipation of
juror overvaluation.
In short, the value of empirical perspectives cannot be seriously
doubted. But we must recognize the limitations of such perspectives as well. I will mention three.
Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683, 693 (1992)
(despite researchers' expectation that mock jurors would consider hearsay evidence
"but then engage[] in some kind of discounting because they considered hearsay less
reliable than eyewitness testimony," the mock jurors "simply did not report using the
hearsay in their decision-making process").
1-Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1075 (1991) (discussing
empirical evidence that observation of demeanor does not improve the accuracy of
laypersons' credibility judgments and some evidence that observation of demeanor
actually diminishes their accuracy).
14 See Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?]
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 651 (1991).
Allen and Leiter speak highly of situationalist approaches to the problem of
predicting behavior on the basis of past conduct. See Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at

1546-49. I think they lean too hard on situationalism; even devout situationalists do
not deny the importance of personality, and "interactionism," an intermediate
approach focusing on both situation and personality, has received much of the recent

scholarly attention. Friedman, supra, at 646.
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First, and most obviously, not all propositions that we would like
to test for the purposes of guiding evidence law can feasibly be
tested empirically. Do dying persons really feel a strong sense of
the necessity to tell the truth? I doubt a scholar could arrange a
useful empirical study that would pass the scrutiny of a human subjects committee. Even if she could, the results would not
necessarily be valid with respect to the particular application of interest to evidence law, in which the statement by the dying
declarant concerns the cause of her own apparently impending
death.15
Second, though evidence scholars, including several of the
participants in this symposium, have done some interesting and
important empirical studies, we tend to be restrained from concentrating on empirical work by a variety of factors, relating to our
training and professional incentives. 6 Perhaps this web of factors
will change over the long run-in which we are all dead 7-- but I
doubt that before then it will change very much.
Third, and most interesting to me, empirical research cannot
provide all the answers, because much of evidence law rests on
values that would not be affected by, or at least are very robust
with respect to, empirical findings. I will make this point in the
three contexts I mentioned above: the role of the jury, hearsay, and
character evidence.
At this conference, Professor Joseph Sanders posed a very interesting question: Suppose empirical evidence clearly demonstrated
that judges are much better than juries at evaluating the merits of
scientific evidence. How would such a demonstration affect the attitude of those who generally favor admissibility of such evidence?
My own answer is a qualified one. If the jury truly were shown to
be deficient in evaluating the evidence, that would be a factor we
could not afford to overlook. To a significant extent, however, our
use of the jury does not depend on our confidence in its abilities as

e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2).
16See Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 807
15See,

(1999); Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?,
39 J. Legal Educ. 323 (1989); James J. White, Phoebe's Lament, 98 Mich. L. Rev.

2773, 2774 (2000) ("[Y]ou law professors ... are unlikely ever to undertake a large
empirical study, notwithstanding your demonstrated interest in empirical work ...
11See John Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform 80 (1923).
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a factfinder. Rather, our commitment to the jury-which is expressed constitutionally*---is in large part a political matter,
reflecting a longstanding reliance on the jury as a bulwark against
oppression by the state. If our attachment to the jury has diminished, at least in civil cases, I believe it is because we perceive less
of a need for such a bulwark than the Framers did, not because we
have learned of deficiencies in the jury's ability to do its job.
Similar limitations on the role of empirical findings apply to
hearsay. An empirical demonstration might reveal that much of the
doctrine rests on faulty premises. But at the core of the doctrine
lies a narrower exclusionary rule that should be largely unaffected
by empirical findings. Our adjudicative system has a deep moral
commitment-again, one that is constitutionally expressed 9 -to
the principle that a witness for the prosecution should testify under
oath and in the presence of and subject to cross-examination by the
accused." This confrontation principle accounts for most of what is
valuable about the hearsay rule. Even if-as may well be the
case-it turns out that the jury is perfectly capable of discounting
hearsay evidence to take account of its defects, and even if the evidence in question is demonstrated to be highly reliable,2' this
principle should preclude admissibility against an accused of testimonial statements not made under the prescribed conditions,
unless the accused has forfeited his rights.' To a large extent, then,
I believe discussions of the reliability of hearsay evidence are beside the point.'
Finally, a similar consideration applies to character evidence. As
I have suggested above, I believe prior misconduct is often highly
probative of a person's propensity to commit similar misdeeds in
"See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. m, § 2, amends. VI, VII.
'9See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. VI.

See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86

2u

Geo. L.J. 1011, 1011 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Confrontation].

11Allen and Leiter follow the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and most of academic
discourse, in discussing hearsay issues in terms of reliability. See Allen & Leiter, supra
note 2, at 1536.
=2
See, e.g., Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 20.
2- Allen and Leiter, like many other scholars, engage in extensive discussions of this

sort. The Supreme Court's focus on reliability in considering hearsay cases has
encouraged this type of discourse. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992)
("[W]here proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a

firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.").
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the future. Furthermore, it may well be that empirical testing
would reveal that a jury is not likely to overvalue the evidence for
that purpose. Nevertheless, I believe there are sound reasons to
exclude such evidence when offered simply to show the propensity
and the person's conduct in accordance with the propensity. Such
evidence threatens to violate a fundamental principle by punishing
people not for the crime charged, but for who they are and what
they have done on occasions other than the one in question."'
In sum, empirical research is crucial to keeping evidentiary law
and discourse connected to reality, but at the same time we must
remember that much of evidentiary law depends on basic value
choices that are unlikely to be affected by empirical findings.
II. ECONOMICS
Several years ago, in expressing the hope that economic analysis
would play a larger role in the study of evidentiary issues, I called
economics an underused tool for evidentiary scholars, and evidence a largely unplowed field for economists.' That situation has
changed to a significant extent, if only because Judge Richard A.
Posner, virtually the personification of law and economics, has at
least fleetingly turned his attention to evidentiary issues.26 My colleague Professor Lempert, however, predicts in this symposium
24This

effect occurs only if the jury or other factfinder misuses the evidence.

Suppose the evidence were admitted and the jurors adhered to an instruction allowing

them to use the evidence to assist them in determining whether the accused
committed the act charged but barring them from letting the evidence alter the

standard of persuasion facing the prosecution. In that case, we might conclude that
the evidence should be admitted for whatever value it had in determining whether the
accused did in fact act in the way charged. But I doubt the jury would adhere to such
an instruction. It is too tempting, once one learns that the accused has committed bad
acts in the past and has been free to commit further ones, either to punish him further

for the past ones or to diminish the regret one would feel about convicting him for a
crime he did not commit.
Note that this kind of misuse of the evidence is not an overvaluation. The jurors are

not according to the evidence undue value in proving a given proposition; rather, the
jurors are letting a proposition demonstrated by the evidence alter the task prescribed

for them by, perhaps subconsciously, lowering the standard of persuasion that they
apply.
21 Richard D. Friedman, Economic Analysis of Evidentiary Law: An Underused
Tool, An Underplowed Field, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1531 (1998).
26 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L.
Rev. 1477 (1999).
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that economic analysis will have little impact on evidentiary scholarship.'
To some degree, this prediction is based on an analysis of Judge
Posner's attempt at a comprehensive review of evidentiary law
through an economic lens. I agree with many of Lempert's criticisms of the Posner article? But I do not believe that article is a
good gauge of the potential of economic analysis to advance understanding of evidence. The article is a hasty scan through the
entire domain of evidence law. When advances come, I believe
they will more likely be at the hands of scholars who patiently address particular evidentiary problems and topics. In addition, I
believe Judge Posner too often magnifies the importance of small
factors, and this lends an unrealistic quality to his article. For example, Lempert properly criticizes Judge Posner's suggestion that
protecting the celebrated (but fictitious) Blue Bus Company from
liability on the basis of naked statistical evidence is necessary to
keep the company running its routes where it provides a majority
of the service.29 But we must give Judge Posner his due: If instead
of talking about the Blue Bus Company, we talk about generic
drug manufacturers, the concern may have significantly more
weight. Lempert is, on the whole, pessimistic about the role that
economic analysis is likely to play in evidence scholarship? He is
correct that, for the most part, evidentiary issues do not concern
potential trades or exchanges-though we should not overlook the
significant situations in which they do. Thus, Professor Eric Rasmusen's analysis of the problems raised by United States v.
Mezzanatto,31 in which the prosecution demands a waiver of evidentiary right as a precondition of entering into plea negotiations,
strikes me as a good example of how rigorous economic analysis
can clarify an evidentiary problem.'2 The implicit or explicit bargaining process that sometimes leads to stipulations may offer
27

Lempert, supra note 1, at 1622-23.

28

As Lempert agrees with the criticism that I have leveled against it. See Richard D.

Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 873

(2000).
Lempert, supra note 1, at 1667-72.
" Id. at 1623.
M513 U.S. 196 (1995).
" Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1541 (1998).
2
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another good subject for such work. Also, as I note further below,
expert evidence arises in a market setting; in that context, only one
of the potential parties to an exchange is a party to the litigation,
the other being merely a witness.
Putting aside relatively confined topics like these that clearly involve bargaining, I believe that there are still ripe evidentiary fields
remaining for economic analysis. Viewed most broadly, economic
analysis of law concerns how rules may optimize the trade-off of
one set of values against another. In this sense, evidence is as conducive to analysis by economic tools as is any other legal field in
which non-absolute values may compete. These values do not have
to relate to money; if we are willing, for example, to sacrifice some
accuracy in truth determination for increased protection of privacy,
that is a trade-off that can be analyzed in economic terms.
Viewed somewhat more narrowly, economics concerns the allocation of scarce resources. Evidence is often expensive to produce,
and evidentiary law cannot afford to overlook this expense in shaping evidentiary rules. Moreover, economic thinking can help
sharpen analysis of how evidentiary law should allocate responsibility for producing evidence and its cognate, risk of nonproduction, between adversaries. 3 Because that allocation is so
central to evidentiary law, game theory offers a natural method for
thinking carefully about how to structure some rules. Thus, for example, I have found principles of finding the cheapest cost avoider
and of game theory helpful in attempting to think afresh about how
hearsay law should be structured outside the context in which the
confrontation right prevails.'
331

have found Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 Ind. L.J. 651

(1997), helpful in this regard. The relative social utility of various outcomes-such as
an incorrect judgment for an accused or for a prosecutor-is clearly critical to
determining the standard of persuasion, which instructs adjudicators as to how
probable it must be that the facts favor a given party for that party to prevail. I had

previously thought that such assignments of utility did not enter into assigning the
burden of production, which comes into play before the factfinder has a chance to
determine the facts. But Hay's analysis makes clear that these assessments of social

utility do indeed play a significant role in the assignment of that burden, for the
assignment may determine the outcome when the party with the burden fails to satisfy
it. Obvious? Perhaps, but I had not recognized the point beforehand.
-4See Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hearsay Issues,
13 Cardozo L. Rev. 883 (1991); Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic,
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).

HeinOnline -- 87 Va. L. Rev. 2038 2001

2001]

"E" is for Eclectic

2039

Furthermore, much of evidentiary law concerns the creation of
incentives, which is a natural field for economic analysis. In some
cases, evidentiary rules are meant to give the parties or other primary actors incentives to act in certain ways. Such incentives may
be aimed at improving the conduct of the current litigation. For
example, to some extent, attorney-client privilege rules are instrumentally based, intended to ensure that clients will not be afraid to
communicate with their lawyers in a way that, if disclosed, might
hurt them in litigation. The incentives may also be meant to improve the external impact the current litigation will have. For
example, the rule against evidence of subsequent remedial measures is best justified, when it can be justified, as -giving a party
comfort that it will not hurt its interests in the current litigation if it
corrects a condition that might cause injury to others in the future.
Incentives may also be directed towards the lawyers; indeed, as
Professor Dale Nance emphasizes in this symposium, a large portion of the law of evidence can best be explained in terms of
attempting to control not jurors but lawyers. 5 Much evidentiary
law developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the role of criminal lawyers was expanding; as the works
of Professor Thomas Gallanis and others have emphasized, the
timing does not appear to be mere coincidence."
In short, it seems that evidence should provide a fertile field for
economic analysis. Lempert nevertheless believes that economic
thinking will have little impact on evidentiary discourse." He points
out correctly that economic analysis is not particularly useful in assessing some considerations-the sense of justice conveyed by
procedure that feels fair, for example-that may be crucial in shaping evidentiary law, and that the analysis often depends crucially
on empirical factors that are difficult or impossible to test. Where
economic analysis nevertheless leads to sensible results, he believes

1-Dale A. Nance, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1551,1561-62

(2001).
See T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modem Evidence Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 499 (1999).
Gallanis argues that the rise of evidence law was a response to lawyers' "new, more
6

aggressive approach to oral evidence," which itself was a result of their increased
appearances in criminal trials. Id. at 537-38.
-7

Lempert, supra note 1, at 1623.
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common sense will get there, or thereabouts, just as well, without
the need for all the extra intellectual baggage and apparatus.'
Perhaps he will be proved right over time. Though I agree that
economic analysis is unlikely to be as significant in the evidentiary
realm as, for example, in the fields of torts and contracts, I am
more optimistic than he that the contribution of economics to evidentiary law will yet be substantial. The value of intellectual rigor
should never be underestimated. Even if economic analysis does
not reveal stunning new insights-and I am not prepared to say
that it will not-it can provide confirmation and deeper explanations for what we think we know. It can challenge those premises
and cause us to work harder to justify them. It can help expose
some of the premises-whether testable or not-on which our conclusions rest, and it can identify material factors that may have
been overlooked.
One other factor gives me some confidence that economic thinking will play a larger role in evidentiary analysis. When a style of
thinking comes naturally to a scholar, he or she naturally tends to
apply it to new problems. The growing importance of economic
analysis in other areas of the law school curriculum has meant that
large numbers of young legal scholars are comfortable with the application of economic theory to legal problems. Many of those
young scholars who work in the field of evidence will, whether or
not they think of themselves as law and economics scholars, infuse
their analysis of evidentiary issues with an economic style of thinking. This development has already begun,39 and I have confidence
that it will continue.
III. EPISTEMOLOGY
Trials deal with uncertainty. Thus, the law of evidence must consider how factfinders-whether real or ideal---assess uncertain

39

Id. at 1623.

e.g., Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial,
101 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2001); Chris William Sanchirico, Games,
Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History, 2
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 342 (2000); Chris William Sanchirico, Relying on the
Information of Interested-and Potentially Dishonest-Parties, 3 Am. L. & Econ.
Rev. 320 (2001).
39See,
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factual propositions, and how new information affects those assessments.
Like many other scholars, I have found the standard, or Bayesian, probability calculus to be a useful, even inevitable, analytical
tool for thinking about these problems. Allen and others, whom I
have termed Bayesioskeptics, minimize the usefulness of Bayesian
methods in evidentiary discourse. Allen continues the conversation
in the paper he has contributed to this symposium with Leiter. '
To a considerable extent, they repeat points that Allen and others have made before, and to which Bayesians, including me, have
already responded; if this is a conversation of fifteen years, I have
the distinct impression that the other side is not always listening.
For example, they contend that "[t]he law applies burdens of persuasion to elements, not to causes of action as a whole,"'" an
assertion that Nance persuasively challenged long ago.42 Along the
same lines, they repeat Allen's contention that if the law did apply
burdens to claims as a whole, this would lead to "unacceptable
consequences, by making the level of proof of specific elements
turn on the fortuity of the number of elements in a cause of action"--and they ignore my response showing, among other things,
that the average probability per element required to support a
judgment is a figure of no significance.' 4 And they continue Allen's
effort to brand Bayesian analysis as algorithmic 45-a pejorative la-

4"

Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1507-10.

41Id.

at 1504.

Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical
Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 947 (1986); see also Richard D.
Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 276,
42

280 (1997) (arguing that a cumulative approach is sensible and not precluded by law)
(hereinafter Friedman, Bayesioskeptical Challenge]; David A. Lombardero, Do
Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-Making?, 36 Jurimetrics J.
275, 286-87 (1996) (arguing that the non-conjunctive nature of special verdicts is
problematic).
11Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1504; see also Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity

and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 604, 607 (1994) (similarly discussing the
conjunction problem inherent in Bayesian analysis); Ronald J. Allen, A
Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 401, 407 (1986) (same)
[hereinafter Allen, Reconceptualization].
4See
Friedman, Bayesioskeptical Challenge, supra note 42, at 282-83.
45They refer to "the Bayesian mirage that algorithms may be substituted for
substantive engagement with the evidence." Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1509.
Frankly, I have no idea where they get the idea that Bayesian analysis does not
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bel meant to make the analysis seem mechanical-without responding to my arguments showing that the effort is misguided. 6
Allen and Leiter also resort to the old chestnut of "computational complexity." Though they do not address most of the
arguments I have made in response, they do make at least a glancing reference to some of them. In an attempt at aphorism, I have
said that it is not the fault of Bayesianism that the world is complicated.47 Allen and Leiter reply that the issue is not fault but
reality-"the world is complicated, and that fact constrains normative advice."' True, but Bayesianism would be a poor system if it
were not capable of reflecting the world's complexity. There are
various strategies for dealing with that complexity. For example, an
analyst can usefully simplify her task by aggregating various possibilities together.
Allen and Leiter answer that "It]his move carries only a false
promise. The real intellectual work will have been done in the
'bunching,' and the failure to 'bunch' correctly will lead inexorably
' This assertion fails to
to false outcomes (except only by chance)."49
recognize the subjective nature of Bayesianism; the only constraints that Bayesianism puts on the probabilities that an observer
may assign to a set of propositions are that they be in the range
from zero to one and that they meet conditions of consistency with
each other. More fundamentally, the observer's understanding of
the world and of the issues at stake will usually provide considerable guidance on how to aggregate possibilities in a sensible way.'

depend on "substantive engagement with the evidence;" it strikes me that it is this
claim that is a mirage.
46See Richard D. Friedman, Towards a (Bayesian) Convergence?, 1 Int'l J.
Evidence

& Proof 348,

349-50

(1997)

[hereinafter

Friedman,

(Bayesian)

Convergence].
See Friedman, Bayesioskeptical Challenge, supra note 42, at 288-90.
Allen and Leiter, supra note 2, at 1507.
19Id. (citing Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying The Burden Of Persuasion And Bayesian
Decision Rules: A Response To Professor Kaye, 4 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 246
47
48

(2000), which asserts (with neither citation nor argument): "There is literally no
reason to believe that the 'lump it together as you please' approach will lead to

factually accurate outcomes; it just as well may lead to completely bizarre outcomes."
Id. at 255.).
"0For example, in a murder case it will probably make sense to batch the
proposition, "The defendant stabbed the victim in the heart at 10:25:15" with the
proposition, "The defendant stabbed the victim in the heart at 10:25:16" and an
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Further, though the aggregation of propositions in a sensible way is
a crucial step in assessing the probabilities that are material to the
observer, it is plainly far from the final step; there is much "intellectual work" remaining to assess the bottom-line probability in
light of all the available evidence. Finally, Allen and Leiter's objections are ironic in light of the fact that Allen appears to have
endorsed aggregation as a way of mitigating problems in his own
theory."
One further point repeated by Allen and Leiter deserves special
attention, because other participants in the symposium continue to
make the same suggestion-that Bayesian analysis is inconsistent
with a holistic approach in which the factfinder considers all of the
evidence together." But, as I have tried to show elsewhere,53 Bayesian analysis is a flexible template. Nothing in Bayesian analysis
requires the assumption that a factfinder ingest and digest the evidence one elemental piece of information at a time-byte by byte,
so to speak-and update its probability assessments with each new
ingestion.l Itis perfectly consistent with Bayesian analysis for a
factfinder to absorb all relevant information and then compare the
relative plausibility of the various stories that might account for all
the evidence.
At the same time, any epistemological system that is going to be
useful for evidentiary analysis must be capable of showing how
adding an individual item to a body of evidence alters a probability
assessment. This function is crucial because the evidentiary system
frequently operates on such individual items, deciding whether
they should be admitted or excluded. Bayesian analysis is perfectly
capable of performing this function. Indeed, this is the function ofinfinitely dense range of similar propositions, but not with the proposition, "The
victim stabbed herself at 8:30."
-11
See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
n'Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 6, at 1861; Lempert, supra note 1, at 1642-43;
Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1534 (contending that the instruction to jurors not to
draw inferences until all the evidence is in "is a striking embarrassment to a Bayesian
understanding of the structure of litigation," because "[t]he fact finders are explicitly
instructed to do the opposite of what the Bayesian argument requires").
5Friedman, Bayesioskeptical Challenge, supra note 42, at 286-88; Richard D.
Friedman, Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Storytelling, Bayesianism, Hearsay
and Other Evidence, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 79 (1992) [hereinafter Friedman, Infinite
Strands].
11Whether jurors should be instructed to postpone consideration is another matter.
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ten performed by Bayes' Theorem-an important aspect of the
standard probability calculus but not, despite the name, the entirety of that calculus.
I will repeat here a challenge that I made several years ago and
that, so far as I can tell, no Bayesioskeptic has taken up:
I cannot recall the Bayesioskeptics ever offering any criticism
about particularuses of probabilistic methods as a tool for analysing evidentiary questions; the challenges always seem to be
at the general level, concerning the value of the enterprise itself
or the overall standard of persuasion. I think they should examine the particulars of what we are doing. I claim that
probabilistic methods have helped us achieve results that are
not obvious but that are sound, intuitively appealing, and readily explainable. If I am right, the Bayesioskeptics should
acknowledge that. If I am wrong, they should show why."
Closely associated with Bayesian probability theory is the classical decision theory based on the expected value of any course of
action. The premise of the theory, often labeled Bayesian Decision
Theory ("BDT"), is that in selecting a course of action, an actor
should take into account the values, or utilities, of the possible outcomes and the probabilities of each. BDT has proven useful for
analysis in a variety of real-world situations,' and in evidence law it
has been especially helpful in analyzing problems related to the
standard of persuasion.
Indeed, for the latter purpose BDT strikes me as a virtually inevitable tool. The determination of a lawsuit is a classic instance of
a decision made under uncertainty. In this case the uncertainty
1-Friedman, Bayesioskeptical Challenge, supra note 42, at 290. Allen and Leiter do
acknowledge, with no elaboration, that Bayesian analysis "does have some value as
an informal heuristic." Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1510. I cannot tell to what
extent this acknowledgment is meant to concede my claim "that probabilistic methods
have helped us achieve results that are not obvious but that are sound, intuitively
appealing, and readily explainable." Friedman, Bayesioskeptical Challenge, supra
note 42, at 290. To the extent that it is, I wonder what all the shouting is about.
6See generally Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on
Choices under Uncertainty (1968) (demonstrating the application of decision analysis
to five different real world scenarios).
See, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. B.
Found. Res. J.487; Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021,
1032-41 (1977).
17
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concerns the state of the world-do the facts favor Party A or
Party B? Given that uncertainty, a decisionmaker choosing between A and B must take into account how probable each state is.
But the general decision rule cannot simply be to award decision to
the party who is favored by the state of the world that appears
most probable to the factfinder. Using logic like that in another
context, a decisionmaker might say, "It is better if I get across the
street now than if I wait a few seconds, and if I go now I will more
likely than not get across without being hit by that onrushing car."
Plainly, the life expectancy of a decisionmaker using such logic
would be short. We must take into account not only the probabilities but also the relative values of the possible outcomes.
I find Allen and Leiter's criticism of BDT58 especially puzzling
because the "relative plausibility" theory that they propound, one
that Allen has long advocated, is perfectly consistent with BDTat least if their theory is interpreted sensibly. 9 The essence of their
theory is the premise that "legal fact-finding involves a determination of the comparative plausibility of the parties' explanations
offered at trial rather than a determination of whether discrete
elements are found to a specific probability."' But BDT does not
require that "discrete elements" be "found to a specific probability." Rather, as Bayesians have shown repeatedly, BDT provides
that the claimant (plaintiff or prosecutor) should prevail if the
probability that the claimant has a valid claim is greater than the
standard of persuasion. The standard of persuasion is determined,
as suggested above, by taking into account the harm caused by
wrong results. The probability that the claimant has a valid claim is
the probability that the facts support an aggregate of propositions
sufficient as a matter of law to warrant judgment for the plaintiff. 1
Assessing that probability also requires an assessment of alternative explanations for the evidence, explanations under which that

- Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1532-34.
, See Friedman, Infinite Strands, supra note 53, at 93 n.40 (making some of these
same arguments in more detail).

Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1527-28.
6See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying
6'

text

(discussing

Bayesian

demonstrations that the standard of persuasion should be applied to the claim as a
whole).
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aggregate of propositions would not be true; Bayesian analysis is
therefore inherently comparative.
Thus, Allen and Leiter's assertion that "in criminal cases the
prosecution must provide a plausible account of guilt and show
that there is no plausible account of innocence"62 seems perfectly
Bayesian, as do statements by Judge Posner that they cite in their
support. 3
Their assertion that "[i]n civil cases, the fact finder is to identify
the most plausible account of the relevant events"' raises more difficulties, but if it is understood in a sensible way it is consistent with
BDT. For one thing, on its face the assertion seems to put a great
deal of emphasis on what shall be considered an account. To draw
on a hypothetical raised during this symposium, suppose the jury
must determine what color a traffic light was when the defendant
entered the intersection, and that under the governing law the
plaintiff prevails if the light was red but not if the light was yellow
or green. The jury concludes that the light was more likely red than
yellow, and more likely red than green-but that it is more likely
that the light was green or yellow than that it was red. BDT calls
for the defendant to win. What would Allen and Leiter say? If, as
one of Allen's prior articles suggests,65 they agree that the defendant should win because the defendant's liability-denying account
("It was green or yellow") is more plausible than the plaintiff's liability-creating account ("It was red"), then it is hard to see how
they are not being Bayesian. Perhaps they believe instead that the
plaintiff should win, because the red account is more plausible than
either the yellow account or the green account individually. It is
hard to understand, though, why the jury should not aggregate the
yellow and green accounts. Allen's prior writing suggests that the
factfinder ought to be able to aggregate accounts at least to some

62 Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1528.

See, e.g., Spitz v. Comm'r, 954 F.2d 1382, 1384-85 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[I]n general
and in this instance the plausibility of an explanation depends on the plausibility of
the alternative explanations. However implausible the [defendant's] explanation
might seem in isolation, it does not stand alone, but must be compared with the
government's alternative explanation....") (citations omitted), quoted in Allen &
Leiter, supra note 2, at 1533.
4Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1528.
65 Allen, Reconceptualization, supra note 43, at 432-33.
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extent'-highly ironic in light of the fact that he and Leiter now
criticize Bayesian analysis for its dependence on such aggregation 67 -and they do not present criteria indicating when
aggregation has gone too far.
Assuming full aggregation of accounts is allowed, asking
whether the pro-plaintiff account is more plausible than the prodefendant account is perfectly Bayesian and perfectly consistent
with the usual understanding that the standard of persuasion in the
ordinary civil case is "more likely than not." But what do we do
about cases in which a higher standard applies, such as "clear and
convincing evidence"? If the relative plausibility theory applies in
the same way to that standard as it does to the "more likely than
not" standard, then it has eviscerated the difference between the
two standards. Therefore, Allen has previously recognized that the
concept of cardinality must come into play. "Clear and convincing
proof," he has said, "is simply a considerably more persuasive story
than its opposition."' He admits this standard is "troublesome" for
his theory." Indeed, once cardinality is introduced, relative plausibility sounds just like probability." If there is a difference, he and
Leiter have not explained it.
Having said all this, I do not mean to deny that parties and their
advocates tend to tell fairly specific stories in court, and that juries
often tend to view the case by comparing such stories. The defendant will tend to say-and will tend to be more persuasive if he can
say-"It was green," rather than, "Gee, I don't know, it was green
or yellow, I'm not sure, but it wasn't red." It would be a mistake,
though, to equate the common practice of advocates and of juries
with a rule of law. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means that
sometimes a plaintiff can say, "I'm not able to say just what happened, but I must have been hurt by the defendant's misconduct."
So too, a defendant not bearing the burden of producing evidence
ought to be able to argue to the jury, "I don't know which of the
Id. at 428 (noting that the parties must be "required to be fairly specific, although
I cannot say what 'fairly' means with any specificity").
1'See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 373, 413
6Ronald
(1991) (emphasis added).

9Id. I confess myself mystified by what Allen means when he says that what he calls
the standard practice "hides... the ambiguity in the word 'considerably."' Id.

1,Friedman, (Bayesian) Convergence, supra note 46, at 353 n.3.
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myriad of ways in which the plaintiff might have been injured is the
actual one,
but it is implausible that it was as a result of my mis71
conduct.
IV. EXPERT EVIDENCE

One of the enduring problems of evidence law, and one that received much attention at this symposium, is that of expert
evidence. I believe expert evidence presents a particularly difficult
conundrum because of the confluence of at least three factors.
First, by definition, expert evidence presents information or a
perspective that is unfamiliar to most jurors and judges. This lack
of familiarity gives expert evidence its peculiar importance and
power to persuade. At the same time, though, it makes the evidence particularly difficult for judges and juries to evaluate. Thus,
on the one hand, it potentially poses the danger that evidence of
little value will over-persuade the jury and lead to unjust results.
On the other hand, an overly abstemious attitude towards expert
evidence might deprive a party of evidence that would justifiably
support its case.
Second, the relationship of an expert witness to judicial proceedings is much different from that of the ordinary percipient witness
to those proceedings. The percipient witness can usually be compelled to testify, and ordinarily if a party needs to prove a given
proposition it will have little or no choice as to which percipient
witness to use. By contrast, the expert witness cannot be compelled
to testify, usually she will not testify absent substantial payment,
and generally the party has a range of possibilities as to which expert to present.
Finally, unlike the percipient witness, the expert witness does
not contribute to the adjudicative process primarily by testifying as
to what she observed with her senses in the particular case. Rather,
she testifies as to principles of more or less generality and their application to the case.
Empirical understanding of the system by which expert evidence
is secured and presented, and of how well it is assessed by courts
and juries, can of course be of great assistance in trying to deter-

7

See Friedman, Infinite Strands, supra note 53, at 94 n.40.
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mine what changes, if any, should be made in the system.' Because
expert witnesses are usually brought to the courtroom by the force
of the marketplace rather than by the force of conviction or of
subpoena, this is an area that is especially appropriate for economic analysis.
Sensitivity to epistemological issues can also be helpful. For example, Bayesian analysis suggests there is more value to the
"ultimate issue" rule than Federal Rule of Evidence 704 recognizes. The justification is not the old-fashioned one that the expert
is usurping the role of the jury by expressing an opinion on an ultimate proposition that forms an element of the claim. Rather, it is
that in most instances, the expert has no useful perspective to offer
in testifying to the prior probability of the proposition at issuethat is, how probable the proposition is as assessed without considering the body of evidence as to which the expert has special
knowledge. The expert can assist the factfinder only by testifying as
to the likelihood ratio of the evidence or as to the components of
that ratio-that is, the probability that the body of evidence would
arise given the truth of the proposition and the probability that the
evidence would arise given the falsity of the proposition.73 Implementing this principle, though, can be very difficult.'
Of greater significance, a Bayesian perspective helps probe the
direction in which Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical?has
taken the law of expert evidence. Daubert emphasizes the reliability of expert evidence as a critical criterion for admissibility, and
Federal Rule 702 has since been amended to confirm this emphasis. Previously, the Rule required simply that an expert be
"qualified... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa7 A very useful empirically-based study is Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991

Wis. L. Rev. 1113.
7-See C.G.G. Aitken, Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic
Scientists 225 (1995); Richard D. Friedman, The Elements of Evidence 95-96 (2d ed.
1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Elements]; Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux,
Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom 60-65 (1995).
But see J.D. Jackson, The Ultimate Issue Rule: One Rule Too Many, 1984 Crim. L.
Rev. 75 (contending that sound decisions based on the ultimate issue rule could be
justified on other grounds, such as that the opinion is not helpful to the jury or that it
is expressed in legally conclusory terms).
71See Richard D. Friedman, Assessing Evidence, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1810, 1836-37
(1996).
'.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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tion," and that communication of her "specialized knowledge"
must be able to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue."'76 The amendment added requirements that the testimony be "based upon sufficient facts or data"
and "the product of reliable principles and methods," and that the
witness have "applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case."'
But what does reliability mean? A reliable indicator of a phenomenon is one that is far more probable to arise given the
phenomenon than given the absence of the phenomenon. But then
there cannot be reliable expert evidence tending to prove the phenomenon and other reliable expert evidence tending to disprove
the phenomenon. If Daubert and the recent amendments were
taken seriously, there would be no room for a "battle of the experts"--that is, for adverse parties' experts to take conflicting
positions as to a material issue. Perhaps that seems at first glance to
be a rather appealing prospect. But, in fact, it would mean that the
court would have to resolve at the threshold all matters on which
expert testimony is offered rather than leaving them to the jury.
Thus, in the realm of expert evidence as in that of hearsay, it is a
mistake to make admissibility depend on a determination of reliability; I am in agreement here with the perspective offered by
Professor Jennifer L. Mnookin at this symposium. The core language of Federal Rule 702 as it stood before the amendment
appears to pose the proper question in determining whether expert
evidence should be admitted: Will the expert evidence "assist the
trier of fact" in understanding the other evidence and determining
material facts? The standard is basically a specialized application of
the balance of probative value and prejudicial potential posed by
Federal Rule 403.
It is tempting in applying such a standard to assune that the jury
is likely to be overwhelmed by misleading expert evidence. I certainly acknowledge that parties offer bad, misleading expert
evidence; the case study offered at this symposium by Professor
D.H. Kaye appears to present an example.78 Yet I think it is a mis7

6Fed. R. Evid. 702 (prior to 2000
amendment).

Fed. R. Evid. 702 (after 2000 amendment).
Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert-Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in
Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1933, 1989-2002 (2001)
78D.H.
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take to make this fear the dominant force in determining the admissibility of expert evidence.79 For evidence to fail this standard, it
must do more harm than good to the adjudicative process. That is,
the jurors must so overevaluate the evidence that it tends to lead
them further away from the truth, rather than closer to it. This is
unlikely to happen unless the evidence is nearly worthless. Some
expert evidence meets even that description; again, the evidence in
the case described by Kaye may be an example. So far as I am
aware, however, the empirical question posed by Sanders has not
yet been answered; we do not yet have any good basis for confidence that judges will do a significantly better job than juries in
sorting out the wheat from the chaff. It is interesting to note in this
light that in Kaye's case, the trial court admitted the challenged
evidence despite all its weaknesses.'
I do not mean to suggest that courts should exercise no control
over juries in the realm of expert evidence. I have argued only that
courts should exercise considerable self-restraint, and that we
should not accept readily the premises that juries will tend to be
led astray by bad expertise and that courts can help set them aright
by filtering out bad expert evidence from good. Furthermore, I
agree with Mnookin that when expert evidence is troublesome, the
difficulty is likely to be not that the evidence is too unreliable to
warrant admissibility, but that the plaintiff's case is, at least arguably, too weak as a matter of law to support a judgment."'
The two concepts are easy to confound because often the plaintiff's case depends entirely on the expert evidence; if it is not
admissible, then the plaintiff must suffer an adverse judgment as a
matter of law. This was true in each case in the Supreme Court's
(discussing the expert evidence used in the Conwood smokeless tobacco case,
Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., No. 00-6267 (6th Cir. Jan 4,2000)).

"See generally Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches
and the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 931, 974-75
(1999) (assuming that "some evidence offered under the guise of science is of so little

value, and of sufficient prejudicial potential, that exclusion is warranted," but
contending that "deference to the scientific establishment in an attempt to fend off

junk science may create another problem-failure to recognize the extent to
which.., the needs of the legal system do not match up with the methods ordinarily
used by scientists").
0 Kaye, supra note 78, at 1989.

See Friedman, Elements, supra note 73, at 107-08; Samuel R. Gross, Substance

and Form in Scientific Evidence: What Daubert Didn't Do, in Reforming the Civil
Justice System 234 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996).
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recent trilogy on expert evidence-Daubertitself, involving a metaanalysis of studies showing the effects of the drug Bendectin; General Electric Co. v. Joiner,' involving testimony by a well-qualified
toxicologist drawing adventurous inferences from animal and epidemiological studies; and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,'
involving testimony of an experienced tire expert on what caused a
tire to blow out. In each of these cases, the methods used by the
experts were open to question-as is often so in cases involving expert testimony-and the conclusions they reached were dubious.
But in none of them was the evidence worthless. Suppose in each
case that, even apart from this challenged evidence, the plaintiff introduced evidence clearly sufficient as a matter of law to support a
judgment. Then I suspect the challenged evidence would be admitted without much difficulty.-"
If I am right about this, then the law of admissibility has been
called on to carry weight that should be borne-if at all-by the
law of sufficiency. In Daubert-type cases, courts have held the expert evidence inadmissible and then granted judgment as a matter
of law for the defendant because of the dearth of evidence supporting the plaintiff on an element of the claim. Instead, if the court
believes that control of the jury is necessary, it should exercise that
control less by ruling the expert evidence inadmissible and more by
ruling that, even given that evidence, the plaintiff does not have
enough evidence to support a judgment. A ruling of this sort would
achieve the same result when the expert evidence is essential to the
plaintiff's case, but would do so without distorting the standard for
admitting expert evidence in other situations, when the evidence is
not essential to satisfy a burden of production imposed on the offering party.
Ruling in this way allows the court to control the jury without
necessarily concluding that the jury was susceptible to being overpersuaded by expert evidence that the court finds unpersuasive. In
a case without significant expert evidence, a judge granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law or for remittitur
need not conclude that the jury was, or would be, bamboozled by
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
See Friedman, Elements, supra note 73, at 107 (posing a hypothetical based on
Joinerin which other evidence supports the plaintiffs case).
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the plaintiff's evidence. Rather, she might conclude that a jury
reaching a dubious pro-plaintiff conclusion would not be doing the
job established for it by the law, reaching its verdict according to
the court's instructions, and would instead be deciding, for reasons
that the law could not accept, to throw money from the defendant
(or the defendant's insurer) to the plaintiff. Furthermore, this basis
for granting summary judgment would not be undercut if the evidence that provided the weak link in the plaintiff's case, leading to
the judge's inference that if the jury found for the plaintiff it most
likely was ignoring its job, was offered by an expert witness.
I suggest, then, that rather than holding expert evidence to be so
unpersuasive as to be inadmissible and then granting judgment as a
matter of law, courts should more readily grant judgment as a matter of law because, even if the expert evidence is admissible, it is
insufficient to support a judgment. One doctrinal factor, however,
has made it easier for courts to follow the former course. It is
commonplace that a party can satisfy his burden of producing evidence to prove proposition X by presenting a competent percipient
witness who testifies to X from her own personal knowledge; no
matter how weak the witness's credibility may seem to the court,
and no matter how overwhelming the evidence of not-X may be, it
lies within the realm of the jury to accept the testimony of the witness who says, "X is true. I saw it with my own eyes." Courts tend
to apply the same principle to expert witnesses. But there is no real
reason to do so, at least in what I have suggested above is the usual
case, when the expert is principally testifying to inferences rather
than to perceptions. Courts are used to holding that a given inference is too far a reach for a jury to make on the basis of the facts
presented to it, and there is no reason why they cannot do so when
an expert witness, and not just a lawyer, has suggested the inference. That is, indeed, just what they do now in holding expert
evidence inadmissible under Daubert.I am merely suggesting that
when they do it, they should more readily do it under the procedural rubric of sufficiency rather than that of admissibility.
CONCLUSION

This conference encouraged an eclectic approach to evidence
law, and I have endorsed one in this essay. By focusing on the perspectives highlighted in the conference-empirical, economic, and
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epistemological-I do not mean to exclude others, even those that
fail to begin with the letter "E." For example, Professor David
Bernstein rightly suggested at the conference that a comparative
perspective can have much to offer, specifically on the problem
that drew special attention at this conference, that of expert evidence.' I have found that an historical perspective illuminates the
law of hearsay and confrontation,' and in general I suspect we evidence scholars would benefit greatly, in ways we cannot even
predict, from a deeper historical understanding of our field. I do
not mean to slight other perspectives by failure to mention them.
The realm of evidentiary law remains a challenging and intriguing
jumble of problems that resists reductionism and that invites wisdom from all quarters.

sSee David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and
Commonwealth, 21 Yale J. Int'l L. 123 (1996).
86See, e.g., Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 20, at 1022-26.
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